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ABSTRACT
Is forgiveness a necessary precondition for reconciliation in transitional processes? By
exploring the relationship between forgiveness, defined as a moral attitude and a metaphysical
impossibility, and reconciliation -an empty signifier- this presentation will reveal the paradoxes
intrinsic to the restorative model of justice. Standing from a critical perspective on the global
industry of transitional justice, it will interrogate the basic principles over which the restorative
model is built; namely, the cathartic value attributed to testimony, the extend of the possibilities of
enunciation within the space of truth commissions as technologies of truth, the epistemological
value attributed to testimony and the commodification of archived memory; lastly, the intricate
relationship between forgiving, forgetting and reconciling. By analyzing the operation of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, this presentation will argue that transitional policies
contribute in very particular contexts to the orchestration of forms of structural oblivion.
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CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RECONCILIATION AND STRUCTURAL
OBLIVION: Is political reconciliation possible without forgiveness? An analysis of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
I will like to start with Jean Amery’s reflection when is presented the ethical dilemma that
occupied Simon Wiesenthal`s mind and lead to the publication of The Sunflower, on the
possibilities and limits of forgiveness (1969). Simon Wiesenthal was captive in a Nazi labour camp,
one day he is called to the Nazi Hospital; a nurse asks him if he is Jew and then he is led to the
bedside of a dying SS member. The young soldier wants to be absolved by a Jew for his multiple
and horrifying crimes. Wiesenthal acted sympathetically but could not pronounce words of
forgiveness and remained silent. However, the question whether he acted rightly remained for him a
dilemma. The Sunflower, on the possibilities and limits of forgiveness compiles the answers of
important figures who have thought about the question of forgiveness, including among others
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Primo Levi and Jean Amery. The response of Amery based on a
rejection of “any metaphysical morality” (1969:106), is that the dilemma is a theological one, and
therefore for him is meaningless. If Wiesenthal had been magnanimous and had forgiven the SS
soldier or had he refused to do so, either ways the decision was politically irrelevant. However, he
emphasizes: “(P)olitically, I do not want to hear anything of forgiveness!” (1997:108; my
emphasis). The reluctance of Amery to attend to the question of forgiveness and to its insertion into
the political sphere is to be understood as a result of his primordial concern with Justice and the
remembrance of the affront. This position will become clearer along the presentation; however, it
leads us to the centre of the argument I will be advancing: there is a confusion between
reconciliation and forgiveness in transitional politics which potentially contributes oblivion and new
ways of victimization.
The Restorative model of justice has become a privileged way of dealing with past atrocities
in the last decades. Within this new approach there is a renewed concern with the memory of
suffering, consistent with a major paradigmatic change in the historiographic production, now
dominated by the study of memory (Ricoeur, 2004, Huyssen, 2003 Young, 1993). The
representation of the past in the realm of memory implies a series of significant changes. To start
with, it results in a growing concern for narratives and testimonies (Ricoeur, 2004 White,1992;
Troulliot, 1995) so sharp that academics have started to discuss the potentialities and dangers of an
“era of the witness” (Wieviorka, 2006) and its characteristic “culture of victimization” (Huyssen,
2003). Secondly, deeply influenced by the psychoanalytical notion of trauma, it places particular
attention to memory of suffering (Huyssen, 2003). Lastly, it draws attention to the selective nature
of memory, which cannot be understood without its counterpart, forgetting.
Within this episteme, formed in the intersection of the neo-enlightened humanism of Human Rights
Discourse and the Politics of Memory, Restorative justice appears as a commendable model,
focused on the victim and its suffering. As opposed to looking for punishment (as supports of the
approach would have retributive justice), it seeks to restore the damage that was inflicted: firstly, it
publicly acknowledges the victim's suffering -an act considered to be precondition for
reconciliation; secondly, seeks to amend past injustices – through apologies, restitutions and
reparations. Finally, it envisages the restoration of individual dignity, in as it publicly acknowledges
the wrongness of perpetrated crimes (Kellenback, 2001). This combination of testimonial,
acknowledgment and apologies is considered to have a significant therapeutic value, in as it is held
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to restore individual dignity. It is likewise considered to “heal” the nation and to hence yield into
national reconciliation.
In this line of though, truth commissions have been implemented along the globe as early as the
1990’s - in various distinct historical contexts - in order to disclose the “truth” about past human
rights violations, provide spaces for victims to regain their lost dignity and ultimately achieve
reconciliation in what are referred to as –post-conflict societies. They are the best-suited institutions
to help countries in transition to leave their past behind and move on to the future, in as they offer
spaces in which individuals are able to narrate their experiences of violence and brutality, which
according to the restorative principle, results in personal healing. As technologies of truth, this
commissions attempt to establish a victim-centred representation of the past and to hence uncover
the truths of past human rights violations based on the value of testimony.
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
Subsequent to the dismantlement of the apartheid, the notion of reconciliation came to
occupy a prominent role in South-African transitional justice, mainly through the operations of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC became a paradigm for the application of
the restorative approach to justice. As stated by the Chair of the South African Truth Commission,
Archbishop Desmond Tutu in his Final Report, the commission believed that “there is another kind
of justice - a restorative justice which is concerned not so much with punishment as with correcting
imbalances, restoring broken relationships – with healing, harmony and reconciliation. Such justice
focuses on the experience of victims; hence the importance of reparation.” (Tutu, 1998) In view of
this, the TRC was grounded on a restorative conception of justice, focused primarily on alleviating
the suffering of victims by healing and testimony and restoring the broken relationship between
victims and perpetrators for the sake of social reconciliation. The TRC's definition of reconciliation
was a complex one, consistent of three different elements: reconciliation with “painful truths”,
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, and reconciliation at a social level which referred
to overcoming racial differences (Moon, 2008:39). With regard to reconciliation at the individual
level, both victims and perpetrators were encouraged to adapt to the major political goal which was
national reconciliation. Former should do so by forgiving and leaving their grudges behind, and
latter by expressing regret and manifesting a change of moral (Kellenback, 2001: Reagan 2008).
Perpetrators were exhorted to recognize the wrongness of their deeds and to both manifest
contrition and a willingness to repair. In these order ideas, the public hearings became a scenario for
the performance of contrition. Because of the influence of Christian ethics in the “new enlightened
moralities” (Barkans, 2000:308-09), truth commissions generally, and the TRC particulary, are thus
spaces for the theatrical performance of forgiveness (Sontag, 1966). This was particularly true for
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, which had a mas massive media impact
(Cole, 2007).
Reconciliation and Forgiveness in the TRC
“The oppression was bad, but what is much worse, what makes me even more angry, is that they are trying to
dictate my forgiveness” (Personal Interview to Kalukwe Mawila In Verwoerd, 2003: 264).
“No government can forgive. Pause. Only I can forgive. Pause. And I am not ready to forgive” (Interview in
Garton Ash, 1997: 36).

The religious and moralist discourse of the TRC was grounded on a consecration of the virtue of
forgiveness. The main booster of forgiveness and reconciliation in South Africa was the Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, chair of the TRC. Tutu considered acts of forgiveness to be “gifts of generosity”
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which in the face of evil would show the good nature of people (Tutu Ed. Helmick, R & Petersen R,
2001: xii). For Tutu forgiveness was a precondition to Reconciliation. In fact, he would frequently
affirm that “without forgiveness there was no future” (Tutu, 1999), and argue that forgiveness
shows the goodness of which humans are capable of. For this reason, he would think about
forgiveness as a manifestation of magnanimity, and hence belonging to the realm of the sacred.
“Exhilarated” by forgiveness, he would express his celebrated phrase: “Please let us keep quiet
because we are in the presence of something holy” (Tutu Ed. Helmick, R & Petersen R, 2001: xii).
Forgiveness in Tutu’s rhetoric is informed by a common definition of the concept opposed to anger,
bitterness and desire of revenge (Tutu Ed. Helmick, R & Petersen R, 2001: xii). The exaltation of
forgiveness as an almost divine virtue was parallel with the dismissal of resentment as a valid moral
sentiment:
God has given us a great gift, ubuntu … Ubuntu says I am human only because you are
human. If I undermine your humanity, I deshumanize myself. You must do what you can to
maintain this great harmony, which is perpetually undermined by resentment, anger, desire
for vengeance. That’s why African Jurisprudence is restorative rather than retributive (Tutu,
D Mail and Guardian, 17 March 1996 In Wilson, 2001:9).
Many have argued that the TRC did not induce forgiveness, but that it provided the opportunity for
victims to forgive, if they were willing to do so: “It was not the intention of the commission to
demand forgiveness and pressurize people to forgive, but to create an opportunity where this could
take place for those who were able and ready to do so” (Audrey, 2001: 356). This claim, however,
contrasts with the praxis of the TRC and the politics of memory of post-apartheid South Africa:
“Personal bitterness is irrelevant. It is a luxury that we, as individuals and as country, simply
cannot afford” (Nelson Mandela In Graibill, 2002:21).
The discourse on Reconciliation promoted by the TRC made alternative narratives to forgiveness
difficult, if not impossible. The South-African TRC was blatantly promoting forgiveness and
directly encouraging victims to reconcile with the perpetrators. The image of the unforgiving person
came to be vilified, whereas those who were inclined to renounce anger and achieve reconciliation
were held in high esteem, as “forgiving brothers and sisters” (Tutu, 1966); commissioners would
pressurize victims, reaffirming that the main objective of the TRC experience was to ultimately
achieve reconciliation through forgiveness: reconciliation and forgiveness were evoked in the vast
majority of hearings, 70% according to the manual counting of the HRV (Verdoolaege, 2006: 74).
Forgiveness was encouraged by tacitly praising someone every time he or she would express signs
of such inclination. For instance, by statements such as: “I have been particularly touched by your
last paragraph where you say that you are not driven by vengeance and a desire of revenge, but you
are gladdened to coming before the commission, because you have got this quest to real
reconciliation” (HRV hearing, East London, June 11, 1997 in Brudholm, 2008; my emphasis).
Contrary to this, testimonies that expressed the refusal to reconcile and the desire to punish were
condemned. Thomas Brudholm's analysis of resentment in the TRC is one of the few academic
researches which engage with an analysis of the value of negative sentiments and particularly the
virtue of resentment. He provides striking evidence of how during the hearings the primordial aim
of nation-building was imposed to victims which manifested reluctance to accept the Amnesty Law.
It is evident from the way in which the commissioners led the questions that a refusal to accept
amnesty would be detrimental to the process of reconciliation, and therefore would cause a major
harm to the country.
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Commissioner: Let me put it this way; do you read newspapers and watch TV, not so?
Answer: Yes I do read newspapers and I do watch television.
Question: I assume that you know about this Truth and Reconciliation Commission that is
going on, of which Amnesty is part thereof?
Answer: Yes I heard
Question: (…) “Do you know this is done by the Government to foster or to promote
reconciliation in the country?
Answer: Yes I do know that
Question: What is your attitude about this reconciliation process?
Answer: I don’t have any comment on that one.
Question: Do you belief in reconciliation?
Answer: Yes I do believe (Brudholm, 2008:31).
The TRC in South Africa as the institution leading and embodying the restorative notion of
Reconciliation, ultimately served to silence the claims of justice of victims that did not accept the
model and rejected the amnesty law. The notion of Reconciliation served as a moral dispositive to
legitimize the teleology of transition. When analysing the complex negotiations of justice implied in
transitional justice the voice of the academic Mahmood Mamdani still echoes when questioning
from a moral perspective the effect of the TRC: “If truth has replaced justice in South Africa, has
reconciliation then turned into an embrace of evil? “ (Mamdani, 2002: 146).
Critical Perspectives on Reconciliation
Is there an intrinsic relationship between forgiveness and Reconciliation? There are
innumerable criticisms to the shortcomings of the restorative Justice approach. Mainly, they point
out to the subordination of the notion of Justice to a meta-narrative of Reconciliation and Truth. I
will argue that the imposition of Forgiveness is a form in which rightful claims of justice from
victims who are not willing to reconcile are de-legitimized. For this reason it is important to deconstruct the notion of Forgiveness in order to understand in a more comprehensive way victim's
testimonies and claims for Justice. If restorative justice is an approach to Justice as it claims that is
mainly concerned with the damaged inflicted and the experience of suffering of the victim, the
boosting of forgiveness is a way of imposing the weight of reconciliation on the shoulders of the
victims so that they become “victims of reconciliation” (Moon, 2009). It is not within the scope of
this paper to analyse the antagonism between retributive and the restorative model to Justice.
Nonetheless, I will argue that the commission dismissed the claims of individuals who demanded
retribution, by imposing a moral narrative in which forgiveness was exalted as a humane virtue and
desires for retribution where associated with a limited notion of resentment and vengeance. In the
last chapter it will become evident how in the TRC hearings the testimonies of victims who were
not willing to forgive were excluded and how they were pressured to overcome their feelings for the
sake of “social harmony”.
Todorov distinction between Justice, politics, morality and heroism is enlightening to
interpret the relationship between forgiveness and politics of Reconciliation in South Africa.
According to Todorov moral action is directed towards other individuals, is fundamentally intersubjective. When the action ceases to be directed to an individual and has as its object an
abstraction, then it is a form of heroism (Todorov, 2000:288) The abstraction being liberty,
communism, even humanity, or why not reconciliation. The thesis I am advancing in this paper is
that effectively, Reconciliation as it was promulgated by the TRC is a meta-narrative grounded
wrongly in a notion of forgiveness which is informed by Christian ethics, and asks from victims to
become heroes, leaves the weight of the future of South Africa in the capacity of the victims to
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overcome their negative sentiments, to forego their claims of justice, in order to achieve a major
political objective. In the process, the notion of Justice is subordinated to the primordial political
goal of national reconciliation.
The TRC failed to acknowledge and incorporate the victim's claims to justice. Since, not all
victims seek health and reconciliation, those who didn’t accept the official rethoric were left out and
had their claims ignored or dismissed as erratic desires of vengeance. This denial was largely a
consequence of the above exposed notions of forgiveness and resentment practiced by the TRC. By
condemning claims of retributive justice and sublimating forgiveness, victims were left with a bitter
taste of injustice, exerted by a system which promoted amnesty and failed to provide justice to the
victims: . As a matter of fact, the pressure to forgive and encounter directly the perpetrator,
produced more psychological damage to victims that were not willing to forgive. The following
apart of a speech by a father whose young daughter had died in the massacre of Heidelberg Tavern,
addressed to amnesty seekers in an amnesty hearing in Cape Town in 1997 reflects a feeling that
was common to many victims (Bruhdolm, 2008: 187): “I have not been able to, despite extensive
therapy and counselling, shed the anger, rage, guilt, feelings of revenge and helpless desperation
art the system that allows murderers to escape punishment” (Graybill, 2002: 45 In Bruhdolm,
2008:21). However, these claims were dismissed and stigmatized as deriving from lust for revenge.
“The hearings were structured in such a way that any expression of a desire of revenge would have
been seen out of place” (Wilson, 2001:120). Negative sentiments were seen as obstacles to the
healing process, since forgiveness was considered as being liberating for the victim. For Tutu
forgiveness was actually the victim´s duty, unconditional and independent of manifestations of
regret by the perpetrator, although the latter were permanently encouraged (Wilson, 2001, Tutu,
2004).
Among the four types of truth defined by the TRC, the fourth one was concerned with
Healing and restorative truth. This corresponds to the main premise of restorative justice which
thought of healing the victim by giving it back the dignity that it had lost. This premise is founded
on a conception of testimony as therapeutic. The claim that testimonies serve to provide “healing” is
a position that Ricoeur defended in Memory, History and Remembering (2004). Therein he argued
that the TRC was successful in providing a space for victims, who undeniably achieved “catharsis”
as a result of their accounts of suffering and of the public acknowledgement of latter (Ricoeur,
2004:483). However, the therapeutic value of testimony proved to be a wrong generalization.
Firstly, the premise was overarching and did not recognize individual differences, neither in the
reactions towards suffering nor in the private forms of grieving and mourning. The literature shows
that some effectively thanked the commission and manifested relief. Nonetheless, statistically this
was not true for the majority of cases: the Trauma Centre for Victims of Violence and Torture in
Cape Town calculates that approximately 60 % of the victims expressed an increased sense of
unease after having given testimony (Hayner, 2001:144). As most of the victims testified, rendering
public testimony reawakened painful and overpowering memories that, in the aftermath of the
hearings, would sometimes result in the reappearance of physical symptoms of distress (Hayner,
2001). The therapeutic discourse of restorative justice served to marginalizes those who demanded
justice instead of reconciliation by fetishizing their positions as weak and unhealthy for themselves
and for the social body (Nagy, 2008: 336)
The pressure to forgive actually caused more distressed in those who were reluctant to
accept the therapeutic discourse on reconciliation. The psychologist Herman refers to forgiveness as
a fantasy which becomes an obstacle for mourning: it can be a “cruel torture since it remains out of
reach of most individual human beings” (Herman, 1992: In Brudholm, 2008). As opposed to being a
condition for “healing”, imposing forgiveness is a cause of more anger in the face of the dismissal
of individual opinions. In addition to this, the discourse of restorative justice, according to which
victims need to achieve healing, results in a reduction of the experiences of victims to a
6

pathological and ambiguous notion of “Trauma” (Humphrey, 2002). As the psychologist Brandon
Hamber stated in a personal interview by Wilson in 1996: “the word catharsis gets used too often in
the TRC. There is a perception that as long as a person is crying then healing must be taking place”
(Wilson, 2001:121). The hearings were designed as rituals of healing based on the performance of
forgiveness. In opposition, anger and resentment were interpreted as signs of an ill psyche and a
weak morality.
Dislocating Forgiveness from Reconciliation
“Forgiveness is mad, and it should remain in the madness of the impossible” (Derrida, 2001:39)
You know, you say you are sorry, but on the other hand, it is also empty words (Paul Van Vuuren In
Krog, 2000:117)

Derrida’s philosophical deconstruction of the notion of Forgiveness as an Aporia, which is
an intrinsic impossibility, is suggestive to the need to analyze the way it is co-opted by political,
moral and juridical discourses. It provides a basis to de-naturalize and deconstruct the social and
political uses of Forgiveness in projects of national reconstruction and nation-building, task of
particular importance in the current political sphere, in which Forgiveness and official apologies
are the way of re-establishing diplomatic relationships and the basis of political reconciliation.
What is the meaning of the response of a mother who is asked if she forgives the killer of his
daughter or the torturer of his son? The response of Jacques Derrida is as follows: “Whether she
says ‘I forgive you’ or ‘I don’t forgive’ in either case I am not sure of understanding. I am even sure
of not understanding and in any case I have nothing to say” (2001: 55). Through this example he is
alluding to the inaccessible realm of experience to which the issue of forgiveness belongs. I strongly
endorse this definition of “Pure Forgiveness” as an Aporia (2001) since it focuses our attention to
the fact that as soon as forgiveness is performed and used as a means of restoration and
“normalization” it ceases to be forgiveness. This is because forgiveness belongs to the realm of the
impossible since one can only forgive what is unforgivable 2. Therefore it “should remain
exceptional and extraordinary (…) as if it interrupted the historical course of historical temporality”
(Derrida, 2001:32). Furthermore, since it is unconditional it follows that it cannot be demanded or
interchanged; it does not obey to an instrumental or economic logic, on the contrary, it operates
under the logic of the gift (Mauss, 1954). Derrida’s emphasis on the pure notion of forgiveness,
which “forgives only the unforgivable” (Derrida, 2001:32-33) points out to an important issue to be
considered in the rising field of what has been denominated “the politics memory”. Namely, that
forgiveness should be divorced from sovereignty (2001: 59)
Reconciliation: An encounter
)

The equation of retributive justice and legal punishment with vengeance and retaliation is
nowhere particular to the South African interpretation. On the contrary, it is one of the main
fallacies and weaknesses of the restorative model as it was theoretically conceived. The restorative
model of Justice was born as an alternative model of criminal law (Uprimny, 2006) critical to the
model of retributive justice which proposers of the alternative considered repressive and
inoperative. Bringing judicial punishment to the level of retaliation, defenders of the notion of
2

Paul Ricoeur devoted his entire work to the analysis of the relationship between memory, history and
forgetting (2004). He agrees with Derrida on the impossibility of forgiveness and its unconditional nature,
since “the fault is in its essence unforgivable” (Ricoeur, 2004:466).
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restoration argued for a model oriented towards reconciliation and social harmony rather than
individual punishment (Minow, 1998; Teitel, 2003). This at turn requires a morality of forgiveness,
in which the parts involved declare a willingness to come to terms, forgive and ask for forgiveness
for the benefit of society as a whole. However, the problem arises when this model, virtuous in its
local application, is co-opted as a Transitional Justice mechanism in its own. Whereas the model
concerns criminal Law, Transitional Justice is by definition a normative model for exceptional
spaces characterized by the commission of crimes against humanity. When, as in South Africa, the
differences between transitional justice and restorative justice are confounded, a very particular and
dangerous ethic emerges, one that demands forgiveness in the face of brutality and conditions
political to individual reconciliation.
I am against the reconciliation as seen from The Hague perspective. I never wronged anyone.
I did nothing wrong. Reconciliation means that we have to meet half way, but that's offensive.
I was wronged and almost my entire family was killed. I care about justice and truth” (Tim
Judah, 2004: 25 In Brudholm, 2008: 198)
The quest for forgiveness, and the subsequent rejection of resentment, is a highly
problematic approach in transitional contexts. Unlike suggested by religious and psychological
discourses, it does not necessarily engender relief and absolution from the shadows of the past. On
the contrary, efforts to overcome resentment can at times represent an enormous burden. Consider
the anxieties that the humanist Primo Levi faced at the possibility of meeting former Nazi High
commanders. His empathic approach - based on the recognition of a common humanity-, his
profound knowledge on human morality and clarity on the nuances of the relationship between socalled “victims” and “perpetrators”, could not dissipate the anxiety caused in the face of such an
encounter. Albeit his rejection of all sort of Manichaeism, Levi experiments a profound confusion
and unease when confronted with the possibility of meeting Albert Speer and Müller (Todorov,
2000; Levi, 1988) readily admitting his relief after the cancellation of the meeting with Speer. We
thus see, overcoming distance in an effort to understand, might be a profoundly disturbing ambition,
even though a very legitimate one. Tzvetan Todorov in his beautiful book “Facing the extreme”
(2000) suggests provocatively that Levi`s suicide could have been a manifestation of vicarious
guilt, the result of the internalization of the desire to annihilate by the recognition of the common
humanity of the victim and the tormentor (Todorov, 2000). Furthermore, he interprets Levi´s
intellectual dialogue with Jean Amery (1912-1978) as a sign of an intimate struggle.
In the same line, authors like Vetlesen (1994) would argue that Primo Levi's rejection of
Amery`s defence of Resentment was a fight that Levi was having with himself, since he had
forbidden himself to hold to resentments. Certainly, there are cases in which relationships are better
not restored; distances better kept, and resentments rather maintained. Amery, who on this point was
radically opposed to Levi, recognized the value of this distance, a distance he never wanted to
bridge as “ it was filled with death corpses” (Amery, 1980). The holocaust survivor and intellectual
Jean Amery was driven by the felt responsibility as a witness to bear testimony. Hence his
philosophical exploration of the victim's subjective experience, most prominent in his collection of
Essays entitled “At the Mind's Limits” (1980). His writing moves beyond a mere testimony of
suffering. Speaking as a victim that examines its resentments (Amery 1980: 63), Amery in fact sets
out to defend a psychic state and justify it against the main corpus of psychological and
philosophical literature.
“I rebel: against my past, against history, and against a present that places the
incomprehensible in the cold storage of history and thus falsifies it in a revolting way”
(Amery, 1980:VI)
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Amery's stance was deeply influenced by the memory politics of the young German democracy of
the 50's and 60's. By the time he had published his essays in 1966, the German people was growing
ever more reluctant to engage with the past of Nazi Germany, while the deeds of the Third Reich
seemed to increasingly lose their ability to affect and interest the public. The time for the “pathos of
reconciliation” had dawned (Amery 1980: 65). In a collective will to overcome the past, and
encouraged by the wealth of the German “Wirtschaftswunder”, the german people longed to
embrace a glorious future in an unison chorus of hope and oblivion. Faced with both the memory of
national-socialist crimes and the public desire to bury them in the annals of history, Amery was
outraged by what he considered an inadmissible foreclosure of the past. According to him, the
person with resentment is not allowed to look towards the future and easily “join the unison peace
chorus all around him” (1980:69). Instead of lifting the gaze towards a brighter future, Amery
defends resentment as a legitimate moral sentiment.
His writing hence not only surges from a reaction to past deeds; it simultaneously represents a
response to a society that in the aftermath of a destructive war is excessively concerned with
“coming to terms with the past” and reconfiguring imperialist and nationalist sentiments. It is
against this excessive will to leave the past behind that resentments blows its horns. Analogically,
the research on post- TRC South Africa evidences that even though this institution had a major
impact in South African´s re-making of History, as an institution, as an archive, it never revealed
The Apartheid as the oppressive system of segregation it actually was (Grunebaum, 2010).
Transitional Justice when confounded with restorative Justice, obscures structural violence by its
medico-juridical interpretation of history. Albeit the call for memory and recognition of past crimes
in transitional contexts, the archivization of history that results from the praxis of this Commissions
as technologies of truth objectifies the past, and separates it from the present and the future
(Grunebaum, 2010; Feldman, 2004).
It is relevant and pertinent to review Amery´s moral philosophy and his defence of negative
sentiments in the contemporary world characterized by this “urge for memory” (Derrida, 2011).
Resentment, which in Aristotelian Philosophy was conceived as a sentiment that shows people self
´respect and esteem, echoes in Amery´s philosophy, the voice of those who fight against oblivion
and comfortable forgetting; of those who rebel against a society which accepts with remarkable
facility the horrors it engendered (Amery, 1980:70). In this view, resentment acquires value and
virtue as a moral sentiment which asserts one´s inconformity with evil and victim´s dignity:
Whoever lazily and cheaply forgives, subjugates himself to the social and biological
time-sense which is also called the “natural one” (…) Man has the privilege to
declare himself to be in disagreement with every natural occurrence, including the
biological healing that time brings about (1980:72).
Amery is conscious about the difficulties of legitimating resentment. His is a position that
largely contrasts with dominant ideas, notably those advanced by Nietzsche. According to latter
(Nietzsche, 1987), resentment evidences a slave morality. It is the position of an individual, who in
the past was unable to act and defend himself, and the feeling of those who “are denied genuine
reaction, that of the deed, and who compensate for it through an imaginary revenge” (Nietzsche,
1987). Resentment, thus, offers nothing but an illusion of agency. Its passivity and its grudge
against the tormentors are what Nietzsche conceives as a sick, bitter and narcissistic anchoring in
the past. This grudge should be superseded by the virtues of forgetting. For it is through forgetting,
through its ability to disregard past misdeeds and weaknesses, that man restores its strength and that
man signals a “superabundance of power which is flexible, formative, healing and can make one
forget (Nietzsche, 1994: 23-24). Nietzsche thus does not condition healing to forgiveness, but to
forgetting.
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Amery contrasts this view of resentment, yet agreeing on both the points that resentment is
a translocation of time and that the victim is captive of its tormented past. Being captured in the
painful memory of the past is, however, not in the least reprehensible. On the contrary, it would be
immoral to condition morality to the natural pass of time and let this dissipate the urgency of
memory (Amery, 1980). Resentment “proposes an inversion of the social conception of the
biological time as healing”, notably because this conception is “not only extra-moral, but also
anti-moral in character” (Amery 1980: 72). Hence Amery's declaration that forgetting and
forgiveness are inadmissible and blatantly immoral, and his rejection of the healing properties
attributed to the pass of time. Pain stays present in the victim, since what happened “cannot be so
easily accepted. Nothing has healed, and what perhaps was already on the point of healing in 1964
is bursting open again as an infected wound”. In view of this, to forgive and to forget is
inadmissible and blatantly immoral (Amery, 2008).
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Conclusive Remarks
The main purpose of this paper was to investigate to what extent truth commissions assist in
acknowledging the experience of suffering. This was analysed in the case of South Africa and the
role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The reason for choosing this particular
commission is that it is considered to be an exemplary model of an institution which deals with past
atrocities, since it focuses on the victims and their experience of pain. The commission put forward
a complex notion of truth; one which was particularly concerned with the experience of the victim
and the narrative dimension of testimony.
This model is promising since it offers the possibility of an official recognition of the victims’
suffering, and a promise of archiving victims’ truth as part of the national collective memory.
However, the result of the research shows that victims attended the hearings as representatives of a
community and not as individuals. Hence, the phenomenological experience of the victims in the
TRC hearings was not acknowledged. In fact, the testimonies were conditioned to a major political
project of national reconciliation. As a conclusion, national reconciliation was made dependant on
individual reconciliation, that is, on the reconciliation between “victims” and “perpetrators”. In
view of this, forgiveness was formulated as precondition for the establishment of a new SouthAfrican nation. The TRC hearings, consequently, became the theatre in which apologies and
expressions of regret were performed.
All in all, the research evidenced that the conditioning of reconciliation to forgiveness imposes a
civic and moral duty on victims. They thus become victims of the reconciliatory discourse.
Furthermore, the therapeutic approach towards the experience of suffering and the metaphors of
reconciliation depict resentment as an impediment to “social harmony”. Combined with the
confusion between reconciliation and forgiveness, this rhetoric limited the discursive space in
which the experience could be recounted.
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